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A PROPOSAL FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL
INNKEEPERS' LIEN STATUTE
INTRODUcTION
When a hotel has the benefit of an innkeepers' lien, it may seize
the baggage of a guest who has not paid his bill and hold it or, pos-
sibly, sell it. The innkeepers' lien was developed as an equalizing
device, given to the medieval innkeeper because of his duty to receive
the guest and the guest's baggage and his absolute liability for the
safety thereof.' Regardless of the validity of the justification,2 the
common law innkeeper had a lien on all types of property which the
guest entrusted to him for safekeeping, except the guest's clothes and
other possessions on the guest's person. The lien continued until the
guest paid the reasonable and just charges of the innkeeper.3 The
absolute liability has long since been abrogated, but the modern day
innkeeper continues to enjoy the benefits of a lien on the baggage
of his guests. Today, 49 states have enacted statutory liens,4 while
Alaska retains the common law lien.5 In most states, the definition
of "inn" is broad enough to include rooming and boarding establish-
ments and so the term "guests" may include many permanent resi-
dents not normally thought of as such. In these establishments the
guests' "baggage" might include all of their tangible possessions.
The statutory liens in three states, Illinois, California and New
York, have been held unconstitutional 6 but none of the legislatures
1. Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109, 120 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Comment, The
Innkeeper's Lien in Missouri, 36 Mo. L. REv. 431, 433 (1971); Note, Collins v. Vice-
roy Hotel, 61 ILL. B.J. 262 (1973).
2. See generally Hogan, The Innkeeper's Lien at Common Law, 8 HASTINGS L.J.
33, 43 (1956).
3. Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109, 120 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
4. See Note, The Innkeeper's Lien in the Twentieth Century, 13 Wm. & M~ARY L.
Rv. 175, 200-01 (1971); Note, supra note 1, at 264 n.1.
5. See Comment, Innkeeper's Liens and the Requirements of Due Process, 28
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 481 n.1 (1971).
6. Collins v. Viceroy Hotel Corp., 338 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Klina v.
Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Brooks v. La Salle Natl Banks, 11 Ill. App.
3d 791, 298 N.E.2d 262 (1973); Blye v. Globe-Wernicke Realty Co., 33 N.Y.2d 15, 300
N.E.2d 710, 347 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1973). In Kerrigan v. Boucher, 450 F.2d 487 (2d Cir.
1971), which was based on the Connecticut innkeepers' lien statute, the complaint was
dismissed on the ground of mootness after the baggage seized had been returned and
the guest had departed from the rooming establishment.
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in the three states have attempted to examine the doctrine which
developed in the innkeepers' lien cases to determine if a statute could
provide for an innkeepers' lien which would be constitutional. This
Comment will examine the rationales for holding the innkeepers' lien
statutes to be unconstitutional and will explore the 1olicy arguments
embodied in the statutes. A model statute, based on recent cases, will
be suggested to guide states which wish to retain the innkeepers' lien.
I. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF INNKEEPERS' LIEN STATUTES
The constitutional challenges to the innkeepers' lien statutes have
been based on the fourteenth amendment's requirement that there
be no deprivation of property without due process of law and on the
fourth amendment's prohibition of unreasonable seizures. Only action
by the state is subject to these restrictions. This section will first
examine whether the requisite state action is present in the execution
of an innkeepers' lien. On the assumption that it is, the section will
then present the fourth and fourteenth amendment arguments. On
the basis that an arguable constitutional issue is raised, the section
will conclude with an examination of the ability of the guest to
waive his constitutional rights by express contract with the innkeeper.
A. State Action
The constitutional limitations of fourth amendment seizures and
fourteenth amendment deprivations of property can only be invoked
against governmental action. The acts of a private individual are
immune from challenges based on failure to obtain a search warrant
or failure to exercise due process of law unless the government is
involved in some way.7 Three rationales have been offered to support
a finding that the seizure of a guest's possessions is state action:
1. the innkeeper's right to possession derives from or is encour-
aged by a state statute expressing state policy; (State Authorization
or Encouragement)
2. the execution of a lien is an act traditionally performed by
7. Cf. Northrip v. Federal Nat'1 Mort. Ass'n, 372 F. Supp 594, 596 (E.D. Mich.
1974).
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state officials and therefore the innkeeper is performing a state func-
tion; (Public Function)
3. the state aids in enforcement of the lien or gives it legal recog-
nition through the judicial process. (Judicial Enforcement) 8
Each of these theories will be examined in detail to determine
whether any of them justifies the conclusion that the seizure of a
guest's baggage by an innkeeper is an act which is sufficiently attrib-
utable to the state to authorize judicial intervention.
1. State Authorization or Encouragement. The doctrine of state
authorization or state encouragement permitted the court in Klim v.
Jones° to hold the California innkeepers' lien unconstitutional.
Not only does the [innkeepers' lien law] outline the conditions applic-
able to the lien in question here, but it is only by virtue of [it] that
defendant Jones had the power to impose a lien on the plaintiff's
belongings, and it is only by virtue of [it] that defendant Jones could
impose such lien without subjecting himself to the forms of civil lia-
bility excluded by [it]. This is not just action against a backdrop of
an amorphous state policy, but is instead action encouraged, indeed
only made possible, by explicit state authorization. 1'
Similarly, a New York court said in Blye v. Globe-Wernicke Realty
Corp.:'12
[l]t cannot be gainsaid that innkeepers are possessed of certain
powers by virtue of section 181 of the Lien Law. By that token, their
actions are clothed with the authority of State Law .... [a]nd their
actions may be said to be those of the State for purposes of the due
process clauses.' 3
These cases found state action even though the New York and Cali-
fornia laws were merely codifications of an accepted common law
8. Cf. Neth, Repossession of Consumer Goods, 24 CASE W. Rs. L. REv. 7, 55
(1972).
9. For the origin of the state authorization doctrine, see Reitman v. Mulkey, 387
U.S. 369 (1967) (repeal of open housing law). For the limitations of this doctrine, see
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 95 S. Ct. 449 (1974) (termination of electrical ser-
vice) and Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (private club with,
liquor license).
10. 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
11. Id. at 114 (Footnote omitted).
12. 33 N.Y.2d 15, 300 N.E.2d 710, 347 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1973).
13. Id. at 20, 300 N.E.2d at 714, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 175.
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lien.'- Under this view, any state affirmatively recognizing, by statute,
a right to take possession nonjudicially would, in effect, be sanction-
ing such action. The taking of the guest's baggage by the innkeeper
is construed as an action by the state, and therefore subject to all of
the constitutional limitations on the exercise of governmental power.r
All seizures made while the statute is on the books might be uncon-
stitutional 6 notwithstanding the existence of an antecedent common
law right or a right created by private contract.
A series of cases involving self-help repossession by secured cred-
itors have reached contrary conclusions. In a Florida case, 17 the peace-
able repossession of an automobile was held to be done, not "under
color of state law," but instead, to be authorized simply by the con-
tract which created the security interest. In a California case,", the
court said:
The requirement of "State action" can rarely be satisfied when the
action is taken by one not a State official.... While difficult factual
situations have compelled some courts to enunciate extensions of this
general rule, in every such case brought to the court's attention, . . .
the power exercised was purely of statutory as distinguished from
common law or contractual origin.
[T]he authority to repossess is based on a contractual right which had
been judicially prior [sic] to the adoption of the statutes in question.10
In Adams v. Southern California National Bank2°c the court re-
fused to find significant state involvement in the self-help repossession
of secured property. The court relied on the self-help provisions of
the Uniform Commercial Code which were invoked by the security
14. Comment, State Action and Waiver Implications of Self-Help Repossession, 25
MAINE L. REV. 27, 33 (1973).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 35.
17. McCormick v. First Nat'l Bank, 322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
18. Oiler v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
19. Id. at 23 (citations omitted).
20. 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 325 (1974). Accord, Turner
v. Impala Motors, 503 F.2d 607 (6th Cir. 1974); Gibbs v. Titelman, 502 F.2d 1107
(3d Cir. 1974); Brantley v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 498 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1974),
Nichols v. Tower Grove Bank, 497 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1974); Bowman v. Chrysler
Credit Corp., 496 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1974); Nowlin v. Professional Auto Sales, Inc.,
496 F.2d 16 (8th Cir. 1974); James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974); Shirley
v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1974); Bichel Optical Laboratories v.
Marquette Nat'l Bank, 487 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1974).
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agreement.2' Since these provisions had merely codified the prior com-
mon law of self-help repossession, the court found that their enact-
ment was not state action authorizing or encouraging the creditors'
acts.
There seems to be an almost irreconciliable difference between
the self-help repossession cases and the innkeepers' lien cases as to
whether a statute which approves a preexisting right, obtained by
contract or common law, is action by the state "authorizing" or "en-
couraging" the exercise of such right. One possibly relevant distinc-
tion between the two lines of cases is that repossessions have usually
been based on a contract specifically authorizing them or invoking
statutory remedies22 while agreements between innkeepers and guests
have usually been silent about the innkeepers' lien. It seems, however,
that contracts which merely invoke statutory remedies without detail-
ing what those remedies are, are closer in spirit to contracts which are
silent about remedies. In both cases, the allowable remedies have been
chosen by the state. The self-help repossession cases have not made
this distinction, however. General invocation of statutory remedies
has been treated in the same fashion as specific authorization of self-
help. In the typical consumer credit situation, where there is a con-
tract of adhesion, the borrower may not be aware that he has given
away his right to notice and a hearing by agreeing to all remedies
permitted by law. Even if he is so aware, it seems to be specious to
say that the law "permits" the remedy but does not "authorize" or
"encourage" it. In failing to distinguish between contracts which in-
voke statutory remedies and contracts which authorize specific reme-
dies, the self-help repossession cases have incorrectly drawn the outer
boundaries of the state action concept. Those self-help repossessions
specifically authorized by contract may be validly distinguishable from
the execution of an innkeepers' lien, although it is at least arguable
that the statute still "authorizes" or "encourages" the repossession.
The Adams case also relied on the existence of a common law
remedy of self-help repossession to distinguish that remedy from state
action situations. This, again, is not a valid distinction. When a state
chooses to act through its statutes, it freezes the common law. In the
21. CAL. CoMM. CODE § 9503 (West 1964).
22. Cf. Clark, Default, Repossession, Foreclosure and Deficiency, 51 ORE. L. REv.
302 (1972).
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face of a conflicting statute, the common law will not be able to evolve
to give further protection to individuals which it might have done
otherwise. In addition, the state statute will prevent subordinate units
of government, such as municipalities, from giving protection against
self-help:2 When the self-help cases have said that a statute does not
encourage that which the common law permitted, they have ignored
the fact that the common law is a dynamic process, constantly adapt-
ing itself to changing circumstances and attitudes. Even if its relevance
could be demonstrated, the existence of a common law remedy prior
to codification is not a distinction. The innkeepers' lien itself long
antedates the United States Constitution and all state statutes.2 4 The
statutory liens did not enlarge or extend the common law rules.25 The
innkeepers' lien cases have properly ignored the existence of an ante-
cedent common law remedy.
2. Public Function. Another legal theory that has been used 20 to
justify a finding of state action in innkeepers' lien and related situa-
tions is the notion that execution of a lien is an act traditionally per-
formed by state officials. The court in Klim stated: "[The lien law]
effectively clothes the California innkeeper with the badge of the
sheriff and the robes of the judge. '27 In Blye the court reasoned:
In this State, the execution of a lien, be it a conventional security
interest (Lien Law Sec. 207), a writ of attachment (CPLR Art. 62),
or a judgment lien (CPLR Art. 52) traditionally has been the func-
tion of the Sheriff. On this view, "State action" can be found in an
innkeeper's execution on his own lien.28
23. Cf. Greenfield, Philip Schrag and the Forgotten Washing Machine, Juass
DOCTOR, Nov. 1974, at 55, 56.
24. J. BEALE, TuE LAv OF INNKEEPERS AND HOTELS § 252 n.1 (1906).
25. 13 CARMODY-WAIT 2d § 84:13 (1966). See generally Fox v. McGregor, 11
Barb. 41 (N.Y. 1851); BEALE, supra note 24, §§ 251, 276, 277; 13 CARMODY-WAIT
2d § 84:19 (1966) ; Comment, supra note 1, at 434.
26. See Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308
(1968) (shopping center); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (park); Terry v.
Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (pre-primary election); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948) (racially restrictive covenant); March v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (com-
pany town); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (primary election). But see
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (shopping center); Evans v. Abney, 396
U.S. 435 (1970) (park).
27. 315 F. Supp. at 123 n.27.
28. 33 N.Y.2d at 20, 300 N.E.2d at 713-14, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 175.
INNKEEPERS' LIEN
In Hall v. Garson,29 a landlord's lien case, the court said:
[T]he action taken, the entry into another's home and the seizure
of another's property, was an act that possesses many, if not all, of
the characteristics of an act of the State. The execution of a lien
whether a traditional security interest or a quasi writ of attachment
or judgment lien has in Texas traditionally been the function of the
Sheriff or constable. Thus [the statute] vests in the landlord and his
agents authority that is normally exercised by the state and histori-
cally has been a state function.
. . . The functional role of the creditor's attorney and debtor's
employer in Sniadach, even when coupled with the formal role of the
clerk who issued the writ, is not significantly different from the role
of the landlady here. And here the state action requirement is also
met.3 0
The Adams case answered the "public function" doctrine of Hall and
attempted to distinguish it by an historical argument:
The property seized in [Hall] belonged to the tenant, and the action
of the landlord was taken pursuant to a Texas statute which vested
authority in the landlord that was normally exercised by the State
and had historically been a function of the State of Texas. The
landlord clearly had invoked state procedures in order to seize the
tenant's property... In [these self-help cases], the creditor was seiz-
ing property that had been entirely his and that, practically and ac-
cording to the terms of the contract, the debtor had not yet paid
for. Further, a strong case can be made that it is a tradition that
repossession is not a state function, and that the creditor was invok-
ing a private remedy rather than a state power which had been dele-
gated to him.
... Historians appear to differ over just when the law began to
ease with respect to allowing self-help. Based on this history, it does
not appear likely that the fourteenth amendment, when written, was
intended to eliminate summary self-help in light of the prevailing use
of peaceful repossession. 3'
The Adams rationale thus offered two distinctions between self-
help repossession and the seizure of a tenant's property: first, that
29. 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970).
30. Id. at 439-40. On the right of a landlord to distrain his tenant's property,
see also Gross v. Fox, 349 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
31. 492 F.2d at 336 (Footnotes omitted).
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repossession is historically not a state function; and second, that the
repossessing creditor had previously owned the secured property out-
right and his right to possession was therefore superior to that of the
debtor, while the innkeeper never owned the property of the guest.
The problem with the first distinction is that its basic premise is
not entirely clear. While self-help had begun to appear by the time
the fourteenth amendment was adopted, at the time of drafting the
original Constitution repossession was exclusively a function of the
state.32 However, an historical excursion into the common law is most
likely irrelevant. The Blye court implicitly makes the argument that
today the execution of liens, in general, is a function of the sheriff.
This time frame (that is, now) is probably correct: in developing the
"public function" doctrine the courts did not explore the extent of
common law governmental activity.33
The second distinction offered by the Adams case, in addition
to not being totally supported by the facts of the case, is also of ques-
tionable relevance. Nevertheless, the idea that the creditor has previ-
ously owned the property has been thought by the Supreme Court to
be important in another context. In Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,3 4
the Court considered the fact of prior ownership when balancing the
interests between debtor and creditor. The Adams court, however,
clouded the issue by considering this factor relevant to the question of
state action, thereby avoiding the harder question of its impact on the
due process balance of interests.
The idea, in the innkeepers' lien cases, of looking to the execu-
tion of liens in general is probably correct. To hold that one should
look only to the execution of innkeepers' liens to determine if such
execution is a "public function," would be to emasculate the "public
function" doctrine. 35 Alternatively, the argument in the innkeepers'
lien cases might be formulated in terms of what action should be
considered a public function. The courts will treat such "public"
32. Neth, supra note 8, at 62.
33. See cases cited note 26 supra.
34. 94 S. Ct. 1895 (1974).
35. This would be equivalent to saying that an innkeepers' lien cannot be state
action because the innkeeper e:ecuted it. Following this argument to its logical con-
clusion would mean that a private park, company town, or shopping center could not
involve state action because they are privately owned and a private election could not
be state action because it is not run by the government. The Adams technique of exam-
ining the specific action in question essentially leads to the notion that state action
exists only in acts by public officials.
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behavior as though it were done by the state and therefore subject
to constitutional limitations. It seems likely that execution of a lien,
that is, depriving someone of his property to meet the claims of an-
other, should be a public function because the decision of a neutral
official would be the least prone to cause a dispute. Any type of self-
help, with or without an obvious breach of the peace, should be a
public function because it is the business of the law to settle disputes
and private authority to do so is exercised only at the grace of the
state. To hold otherwise would permit private individuals to take the
law into their own hands and avoid judicial review.
3. Judicial Recognition or Enforcement. There is another pos-
sible rationale for a finding of state action, but it has not been argued
successfully in any of the innkeepers' lien cases. This rationale is
based on the idea that judicial recognition or enforcement of the inn-
keepers' lien is state action, even though the lien itself might be a
purely private arrangement.36 Judicial enforcement might occur in
the form of a judicial sale of the baggage, a deficiency action by the
innkeeper or as the innkeeper's defense to a guest's suit for damages
or an injunction.3 7 The Adams case formulated a reply to this argu-
ment by noting that the enforcement is not related to the act of sei-
zure. The court also found that most of the cases establishing the
doctrine are racial discrimination cases and may be alternatively ex-
plained as "public function" cases. Finally, the Adams court held that
subsequent cases have established that:
[S]tate enforcement procedures, applied neutrally, will not alone
rise to the level of state action absent a showing that a state in apply-
ing its law is privy to a private party's discriminatory purpose, or
that some significant state power has been delegated to the private
organization or individual.5 5
In summary, while the repossession and innkeepers' lien cases
seem to agree that judicial enforcement of a lien is not state action,
there is an almost irreconcilable difference between them on the issue
of whether there is state action in the statutory authorization of the
36. Cf. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (damage suit); Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (injunction, revesting of title). But cf. Evans v. Abney,
396 U.S. 435 (1970) (reversion of testamentary trust); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226(1964) (criminal trespass).
37. Cf. Comment, supra note 14, at 34.
38. 492 F.2d at 337 (citations omitted).
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lien or in the private performance of a public function. Any attempt
to distinguish the two lines of cases on the basis of whether the statu-
tory provision restates the common law or modifies it, would not be
satisfactory, even if the relevance of such a distinction could be dem-
onstrated. When a state enacts a statute, it has chosen to act, regard-
less of whether the same results would have occurred under a common
law situation that might not involve state action. Private action is
either authorized by that statute or it is not, again regardless of the
prior common law situation. Similarly unavailable as distinctions are
the length of time private seizure has been allowed and the existence
of a security interest in the specific property seized. It remains to be
seen whether an innkeeper's seizure based purely on a contract would
be considered an action by the state. As a form of self-help, such ac-
tions by innkeepers should be subject to judicial review and super-
vision in order to prevent mistakes and abuses.
The cases might also be distinguished in accordance with the
interests involved, but such analysis is more appropriate to the issue
of whether or not there was a deprivation of due process than whether
or not there was state action. Fixing the boundaries of due process
necessarily requires an ad hoc determination of the costs and benefits
of the particular procedure.30 It seems inappropriate, however, to con-
dition all judicial supervision of self-help on an ex post facto deter-
mination that the individual's interest outweighs society's in a par-
ticular case, which would be the result if state action were determined
on a balancing of the interests involved.
Constitutional limitations only apply to the exercise of govern-
mental power. Thus in determining the constitutional issue of state
action the courts should look directly at the traditional tests and
establish the threshold acts which constitute state action and not at-
tempt to balance the interests involved.
B. Due Process of Law
1. Requirements of Procedural Due Process. The fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "No State
shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property; without due
process of law." Procedural due process requires that one be given
39. See generally Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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notice and an opportunity to be heard before being deprived of prop-
erty.40 The Supreme Court has indicated, in Sniadach v. Family Fi-
nance Corp.,41 that even debt collection methods of private individuals
must comply with due process requirements, provided, of course, that
the requisite state action is present. After Sniadach, there was at first
some confusion over whether due process considerations were neces-
sary if the property subject to seizure was not a necessity of life. The
Supreme Court has determined that the rules of due process must be
applied regardless of the importance of the property,42 although the
severity of the deprivation may certainly be relevant to the ultimate
outcome of the balancing test. In line with such reasoning, the inn-
keepers' lien has been declared unconstitutional in three states for
failure to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard.43
Due process is not an absolute, unyielding standard. The theme
that due process requires that all interests be considered runs through
all of the cases and the literature.44 "Even in Sniadach, it was admitted
that a showing of overriding creditor interest would allow a taking of
property without a hearing."45 In the recent case of Mitchell v. W.T.
Grant Co., 40 the Supreme Court indicated that certain factors are
relevant to whether a statute authorizing a debt collection procedure
is constitutional. Among these are: a security interest in the specific
property; seizure and retention of the property by the sheriff; sworn
allegations of specific facts; and an opportunity for an early hearing
and a damage suit for wrongful use of the procedure. Therefore, in
order to assess the due process requirements of a constitutional statute
permitting an innkeepers' lien, such interests must be determined and
balanced.
2. The Innkeeper's Interest. The innkeeper has an interest in re-
ceiving amounts owed him by the guest. The innkeepers' lien furthers
this interest by allowing the innkeeper to obtain quasi in rem juris-
diction and by preventing removal, destruction or concealment of the
40. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
41. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
42. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
43. See cases cited note 6 supra.
44. Cf. Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430, 440 (5th Cir. 1970). For a list of cases
holding that due process requires a balancing test, see Comment, supra note 5, at
485 n.33.
45. Note, The Innkeeper's Lien in the Twentieth Century, 13 Wms. & MARY L.
REV. 175, 184 (1971).
46. 94 S. Ct. 1895 (1974).
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guest's baggage.47 It also encourages payment because of the hardship
that the guest suffers when he is deprived of his property.
There is an argument that the lien allows the innkeeper to estab-
lish jurisdiction.
If the innkeeper were required to have a hearing prior to the
seizure of a guest's goods, the guest could easily avoid the proceeding
by taking his property and leaving the jurisdiction before a hearing
was had but after notice of it was given. . . . Since a guest is usually
a traveller there is nothing to prevent his leaving quickly. By allow-
ing the innkeeper to take possession of a guest's property prior to
notice and a hearing, jurisdiction is conferred upon the court such
that if an in personam judgment is not available, an in rem judgment
against the property detained or a non-judicial sale after notice will
at least partially satisfy the amount owed the innkeeper.48
However, none of the innkeepers' lien statutes in question 49 were
drawn narrowly enough to serve only these purposes. The court in
Blye makes this explicit:
Nor does this statute limit summary seizure to those extraordi
nary situations necessitating prompt action-e.g., to secure the credi-
tor's interest in obtaining jurisdiction for purposes of bringing a non-
payment suit or in preventing the debtor from removing or concealing
his property to prevent future execution on any judgment that
might be obtained.... The fact is that the statutory scheme does not
contemplate the bringing of a nonpayment suit, nor any judicial de-
termination, pre or post seizure, of the validity of the keeper's claim.
The statute sweeps broadly and, as a matter of course, permits the
unchecked summary seizure of a guest's property without regard to
the validity of the particular claim and without regard to whether
the particular guest is likely to remove or conceal himself and his
property if given notice and opportunity for a hearing.50
47. Mitchell recognized these interests: "The danger of destruction or alienation
cannot be guarded against if notice and a hearing before seizure are supplied." 94 S.
Ct. at 1900. However, it goes even further: "Wholly aside from whether the buyer,
with possession and power over the property, will destroy or make away with the goods,
the buyer in possession of consumer goods will undeniably put the property to its in-
tended use, and the resale value of the merchandise will steadily decline as it is used
over a period of time." Id. at 1900-01.
48. Brief for Intervenor-Respondent at 8, Blye v. Globe-Wemicke Realty Co., 33
N.Y.2d 15, 300 N.E.2d 710, 347 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1973).
49. CAL. Civ. CoDE § 1861 (West Supp. 1974); ILL. Rav. STAT. chs. 71, 82,
§§ 2, 57 (1969); N.Y. LIEN LAw § 181 (McKinney 1966).
50. 33 N.Y.2d at 21, 300 N.E.2d at 714-15, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 176.
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A second problem with the argument that the innkeepers' lien
is necessary to establish quasi in rem jurisdiction is that it may result
in limited practical success. A transient would find it very easy to take
all of his possessions and leave the jurisdiction. When the guest is a
lodger who stays for significant periods of time there is comparatively
insignificant danger that he will leave the state just to avoid paying
a lodging bill.5 However, the fact that the innkeepers' lien would
not be able to serve its purpose in some, or even in most, cases is not
necessarily a reason for denying it in all instances.
A final point to note about a legitimate innkeeper interest in
summary seizure is that, in fact, it was not present in any of the cases
holding the lien unconstitutional. All of the cases involved long term
residents who were locked out of their rooms and away from their
belongings for failure to pay rent. None was threatening to leave the
jurisdiction and none was threatening to destroy or conceal his
property, although one' allegedly was threatening to destroy hotel
property.5 2 If a statute were drawn narrowly and applied in a case
where there was a real danger of the guest leaving the jurisdiction,
thie innkeepers' lien might be upheld because of the legitimate, over-
riding creditor interest.
3. Society's Interest. Society may have an interest in the lien
other than simply seeing that the innkeeper receives his just charges.
At this point, a comparison with consumer credit is useful. Efficient
and effective creditor remedies are in the public interest because with-
out them credit would be less available to the public. 53 This argu-
ment would extend to the hotel situation only if accommodations in
inns do not become scarcer and less available to the public as a result
of innkeepers no longer being able to utilize the "lock-out."
Similarly, the cost of hotel accommodations would not be in-
creased by the absence of the innkeepers' lien. In the consumer credit
situation the goods (primarily automobiles, but also some major ap-
pliances or furniture) are repossessed for leverage, but also have some
value and can be sold to pay off at least part of the debt. In the hotel
situation the goods are often worthless and no attempt is even made
to sell them. They are usually seized simply to pressure the guest into
paying the bill. The innkeepers' lien, therefore, succeeds in reducing
51. Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. at 124.
52." Brooks v. LaSalle Nat'I Bank, 11 Ill. App. 3d 791, 298 N.E.2d 262 (1973).
53. Neth, supra note 8, at 35.
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the total cost of hotel availability only to the extent that guests have
paid off solely in order to reclaim their property. Assuming that even
this very limited savings is passed on to the public through cost re-
ductions by the innkeeper, it can be said that society has some, albeit
very slight, interest in the preservation of the innkeepers' lien. But
this interest may be counterbalanced by the fact that it is of question-
able desirability to apply economic pressure, in society's name, to al-
legedly nonpaying roomers or boarders, who might be living a mar-
ginal existence or who may have legitimate defenses against payment.
In addition, summary seizure reduces the total cost of hotel accom-
modations only by the amount that the innkeeper would be charged
for a hearing if a hearing were held. It is reasonable to assume that
this saving is minimal and probably insufficient to justify much incon-
venience to the guest. The amount society saves by reason of summary
seizure includes the value of property which a hearing would find may
not be legitimately seized by the innkeeper. It is not equitable to
charge a societal saving to a guest otherwise without fault.
It has been suggested that an innkeeper can require identification
or payment in advance to guarantee that he will be paid even if he
no longer has a lien on the guest's property. 4 While advance payment
might be feasible on a month-to-month basis for long-term guests, it
is undesirable and inexpedient for the hotel industry generally. 5 It
is contrary to the convenience sought by travelers because of the cus-
tom of charging the cost of meals, telephone calls and other items
to the guest's bill.56
It has been suggested that the possibility of a lien in the future
encourages innkeepers to be more flexible in dealing with slow pay-
ers.5 7 This is highly unlikely, since the only value of the seized prop-
erty is the pressure it exerts on those who are able to pay but are not
doing so. It would be a generous innkeeper indeed who gives this sort
of guest a grace period.
It has also been argued that if the statutory lien is struck down,
the hotels will try to substitute their own lien system by contract, and
that this would afford less protection to the guests than the statute
54. Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. at 124; Blye v. Globe-Wernicke Realty Co., 33
N.Y.2d at 22 n.5, 300 N.E.2d at 715, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 177.
55. N. COURNOYER, INTRODUCTION TO HOTEL AND RESTAURANT LAW 407 (2d ed.
1968).
56. Brief, supra note 48, at 9.
57. Id. at 9 n.*.
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did. 8 This position ignores several important factors. Inns will force
their guests to agree to such a lien only if its value justifies its incon-
venience. If the statute remains unrepealed, any execution by an inn-
keeper could be considered to be authorized by it and therefore still
invalid.P9 There remains a minimal possibility that the bare contract
right to execute the lien could be considered state action under the
public function or judicial enforcement doctrines and, again, the exe-
cution would be illegal.60 It seems likely, therefore, that holding the
innkeppers' lien statutes unconstitutional does not interfere with a
significant societal interest.
4. The Guest's Interest. The interests in favor of the innkeepers'
lien must be balanced by the guest's interest in the possession of his
property. The Klim case provides a catalogue of the evils of the inn-
keepers' lien.
.... [A]II of the boarder's possessions may be denied him if such pos-
sessions are all kept in his lodgings. With the probable exception of
motels and inns, in each of the other rooming establishments . . .
it is altogether likely that the occupant thereof keeps all his worldly
goods there.
... [I]t may well result in the loss of a boarder's job... [if it] denies
.the boarder access to his very tools of trade or other means of liveli-
hood . . . [or] personal identification papers, credentials, licenses
and the like....
[he imposition of the lien may often result in dubious or fraudulent
claims being paid by the harried boarder with valid legal defenses
being relegated to the dustbin.
f [There are] virtually no exemptions from its coverage .... [It] thrusts
the allegedly defaulting boarder out onto the street without any pos-
sessions other than what he can manage to carry on his person.61
One writer sees the main problem of self-help in the following man-
ner:
[T]he mere threat of such action was often enough to force the
debtor, who may have needed or yery much wanted the continued
use of the goods, to capitulate. Even if such cases were uncommon,
it is unjust to deny a debtor a hearing merely because most debtors
58. Id. at 9.
59. See notes 9-24 supra & accompanying text.
60. See notes 25-39 supra & accompanying text.
61. 315 F. Supp. at 122-24.
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are unsuccessful in court and because we want to avoid the expense
of determining if he is an exception to the usual result. To do justice
in individual cases is perhaps expensive but it seems to me to be the
essence of due process.6 2
5. The Balance. When all factors were considered, the courts
have struck the balance against the innkeepers' lien. 8 No overriding
state or creditor interest was found. The guest's interests in possession
and use of his property have outweighed the innkeeper's interest in
prehearing seizure. In all four recent cases in which innkeepers' lien
statutes were challenged, therefore, they were found to be constitu-
tionally invalid because they violated the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 64
C. The Fourth Amendment
An additional constitutional challenge is posed by the fourth
amendment prohibition against unlawful seizures. The fourth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their . . . effects, against
unreasonable . . . seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the.., things to be seized.
In its own terms, the fourth amendment could be read as prohibiting
an unreasonable seizure of a guest's baggage by the innkeeper. It is
not at all clear, however, that the fourth amendment's prohibition
applies to seizures made by private individuals.'5 If it applies to such
62. Neth, supra note 8, at 34.
63. See Collins v. Viceroy' Hotel Corp., 338 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Klin
v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. at 124; Blye v. Globe-Wernicke Realty Co., 33 N.Y.2d at 22, 300
N.E.2d at 715, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 177.
64. See cases cited note 6 supra. For an example, which was overruled by Blye,
of the older line of cases holding the lien constitutional, see Horace Waters & Co. v.
Gerard, 189 N.Y. 302, 82 N.E. 143 (1907). For a list of such older cases, see Note,
supra note 45, at 184.
65. See generally Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) (fourth
amendment only restrains activities of the sovereign authority); Gross v. Fox, 349
F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (fourth amendment applies in landlord's distraint
action); McCormick v. First Nat'l Bank, 322 F. Supp. 604, 607 (S.D. Fla. 1971)
(fourth amendment applies in repossession case); Sackler v. Sakler, 15 N.Y.2d 40,
43, 203 N.E.2d 481, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83, 85 (1964) (fourth amendment protections
applicable only to searches and seizures by government officers and agents), Williams
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seizures, there is no need for a finding of state action. But if the in-
terest sought to be protected is freedom from general searches by
agents of the government, the fourth amendment's prohibition could
be restricted to seizures by government agents, and it is unlikely that
the innkeeper's action, while meeting the standards of state action
under the tests discussed above, would allow the guest to invoke the
amendment's protection.
Since, under the current statutory scheme, an innkeeper would
not be able to obtain a warrant66 the fourth amendment could impose
an absolute prohibition on seizures by the innkeeper and the issue
might be reduced to simply the existence of a valid waiver. The inn-
keeper might argue that the courts should infer such a waiver on the
ground that the innkeeper's seizure would have been peaceable and
on his own premises. On the other hand, one writer has expressed
doubts that such a waiver could be implied so easily:
The party claiming consent in lieu of a proper search warrant
carries the heavy burden of showing that the consent was freely, vol-
untarily, and intelligently given, was unequivocable and specific, and
was uncontaminated by duress or coercion, actual or implied....
The rights of the individual ... can also be waived by contract at the
time of [entering into the transaction].67
These issues are probably moot, however, as the fourth amendment
argument has not prevailed in any innkeepers' lien case. In view of
the difficult issues presented by the fourth amendment, the question
of innkeepers' lien statutes is probably best resolved under procedural
due process guidelines.
D. Express Waiver of Constitutional Rights
Even if other courts accept the position that the innkeepers' lien
is a violation of due process, the possibility remains that guests can
v. Williams, 8 Ohio Misc. 156, 221 N.E.2d 622, 626 (Ct. C.P. 1966) (no individual
has a greater power than the government itself to make illegal seizures); Comment,
Prejudgement Replevin and Self-Help Repossession, 17 ST. Louis U.L.J. 127, 138
(1972) (fourth amendment does not apply to such seizures by private persons).
66. But cf. Guzman v. Western State Bank, 381 F. Supp. 1262, 1265 (D.N.D.
1974), where the court stated that probable cause is the constitutional standard for
warrants of attachment. -
67. Comment, supra note 65, at 139.
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waive their constitutionally protected right to notice and a hearing.08
The waiver must be knowingly and intelligently given.0 9 Factors that
might be relevant to a determination of knowledge and volition in-
clude the presence of bargaining for the contract terms, the equality
of bargaining power, the absence of a form contract, the waiver not
forming a necessary precondition to obtaining a room and a showing
that the guest was actually made aware of the significance of the
waiver.70 Because of the relatively small value of a transient's baggage
and because of the competition among hotels to attract transient
guests, it is likely that waiver will be requested of long-term guests
much more frequently than it will be requested of transients. The re-
lationship of an innkeeper with his long-term guest is very similar to
a landlord-tenant relationship. The absence of a genuine equality of
bargaining power may result in a holding that waiver by a long-term
guest is presumptively unconstitutional. The situation of the transient
is distinguishable from that of the long-term guest and from the con-
sumer credit situation 1 because of the much greater bargaining power
of the transient. In light of the very limited return that innkeepers
can expect from summary seizure of the transient's baggage, the inn-
keeper would be reluctant to trouble the transient with the red tape
necessary to effect a valid waiver. Despite this, or perhaps because of
it, the innkeeper and the transient could probably contract for a valid
waiver of constitutional rights. The waiver would be valid if the
transient guest could retain his rights by paying an additional charge
(to indicate bargaining and a meaningful alternative) and if the
waiver was set forth in a clause separately signed by the guest.
II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Innkeepers may contend that they are free to contract for a lien
on the guest's baggage regardless of the constitutionality of the statute
and regardless of whether the statute is repealed. It is arguable that
such a contract could be considered state action under the public
68. Cf. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191(1972); D. H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
69. Neth, supra note 8, at 28.
70. Comment, supra note 14, at 38.
71. See generally Neth, supra note 8, at 29, 58.
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function or judicial enforcement theories. If so, seizure of baggage
without notice and hearing would continue to constitute a depriva-
tion of due process. If the contract between innkeeper and guest is
one of adhesion the courts will be hesitant to find an adequate volun-
tary waiver.72 But voluntariness is the standard for the waiver of a
constitutional right. If the right to seize baggage arises only from the
contract, and state action is not found, there is no violation of a con-
stitutional right and a different standard of awareness may apply, al-
lowing the innkeeper his lien if the contract specifically provides for
it.
If the contract is found constitutional and sufficiently specific, it
may still be struck down on the basis of unconscionability. "Uncon-
scionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of
meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with
contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party."73
If all inns were requiring the lien, as would be likely in the residen-
tial establishments, then there might be no meaningful choice. If the
contract were found to be unconscionable, the guest would be able
to apply to court to regain his property, and, possibly, damages.
With all of the attacks that any form of innkeepers' lien is likely
to face in the courts, the necessity for having any type of lien should
seriously be questioned. It can provide an extremely unhappy situa-
tion for the guest while at the same time affording the innkeeper little
guarantee of payment. Klim explored this issue, promulgating a legis-
lative policy argument as an alternative ground for the decision:
Although the reasons underlying the need for such lien have largely
passed from the scene, the innkeeper in California still retains
his older and almost unfettered power under the lien statute....
[T]he victim of the lien has no greater rights than he would have had
half a millenium ago.
. . [W]hen the reason behind a rule disappears, so should the
rule.... Accordingly, to whatever extent a summary procedure was
necessary to make the innkeepers' lien equal in scope to his potential
liability [for the safety of guest and baggage] has been so reduced as
to no longer call for such a draconian approach.. .. 74
72. Comment, supra note 65, at 151.
73. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir.
1965).
74. 315 F. Supp. at 120-21.
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Some method of treating the innkeeper-guest relationship, other
than the present statutory scheme, might be desirable. The National
Consumer Act gives the consumer the right to a hearing before execu-
tion on his property which has been pledged as collateral. Such a
procedure, in essence, is equivalent to the situation in those states
where the innkeepers' lien has been declared unconstitutional but has
not been replaced by a valid statute. Following this procedure, how-
ever, an innkeeper might be injured in the situation where the guest
actually does destroy his baggage or take it out of state.
Another alternative to the current statutory scheme would be to
force the innkeeper to elect between seizure of the property and suit
against the guest. Some judicial doctrine before the enactment of the
Uniform Commercial Code forced an election of remedies between
repossession of the collateral and personal judgment, as does the Uni-
form Consumer Credit Code.76 Due to the usually insignificant resale
value of seized baggage, depriving the innkeeper of a personal remedy
would be a very severe step. However, forcing him to pursue the per-
sonal remedy, rather than the in rem remedy would not, in most cases,
create great hardship.
The main problem with the innkeepers' lien is that, even where
it might be constitutionally permitted, such as where it is used to ac-
quire quasi in rem jurisdiction over a transient or to prevent the re-
moval of his property, it has not been used extensively by innkeep-
ers. 77 Where the innkeepers' lien has been used, its purpose has been
to lock a long-term resident away from all of his belongings in order
to force him to pay his rent. In this situation, the use of the innkeep-
ers' lien is of highly dubious constitutionality. An innkeepers' lien
statute should allow prehearing seizure of baggage only when the guest
is a transient. When the guest is a long-term resident, the innkeeper
should not have any more protection than any landlord would have
against his tenant. Before the long-term resident's baggage may be
seized, he should have the opportunity to convince a court that the
seizure is improper. With these factors in mind, this Comment will
conclude by attempting to design an innkeepers' lien statute that
75. National Consumer Act § 5.208 (First Final Draft 1970).
76. Clark, supra note 22, at 307, citing 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS
IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 1182 (1965). See Clark, supra note 22, at 331 (discussion of
Uniform Consumer Credit Code).
77. Cf. text accompanying note 52 supra.
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would be constitutional, cognizant of the interests of the guest and
yet providing protection for the innkeeper in the occasional situation
where prehearing seizure may provide his only hope of obtaining pay-
ment.
III. PROPOSED RESOLUTION OF DIFFICULTIES WITH
PREHEARING SEIZURE
A. Constitutional Requirements
Goldberg v. Kelly78 held that before welfare benefits could be
terminated the recipient was entitled to notice detailing the reasons
for termination and to a hearing before an impartial decision maker
allowing oral argument, cross-examination of adverse witnesses, pres-
ence of retained counsel and culminating in a statement indicating
the reasons for the finding. It is difficult to reconcile these hearing
requirements with the procedure for the ex parte "hearing" allowed
in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.79
In that case, the Louisiana sequestration statute authorized a se-
cured creditor to apply to a judge for a consideration of the merits
of his allegations. In the proper case the court could direct the sheriff
to seize the property. The hearing requirements might be justified on
the basis of the nature of the items to be repossessed. If so, in the case
of the long-term guest, the nature of the baggage generally seized is
essential and, based on that distinction, should require a full-scale
hearing. However, especially for the transient whose baggage is not so
essential, the other elements of Mitchell may be sufficient to sustain
the more limited proceeding involved in an ex parte order. The ele-
ments of Mitchell that may turn out to be controlling, as to whether
a procedure is constitutional, are the sworn allegations, the early op-
portunity for the return of the property at a hearing or by posting a
bond, and the availability of a damage suit for wrongful seizure.
[I]t may be taken for granted that some creditors will seek to
enlarge the exception [to the general rule requiring notice and a hear-
ing] by alleging falsely or mistakenly that immediate danger exists to
the property, where such is not the case, in order to avoid the red-
78. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
79. 94 S. Ct. 1895 (1974).
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tape of the notice and preliminary hearing. This manipulation will
create a line-drawing problem for the courts, but it is not beyond
their administrative capacity to distinguish promptly and fairly be-
tween those cases in which the creditor is in real danger of being
frustrated through the misconduct of the debtor and those in which
he is not.8 0
The following proposed statute takes these factors into considera-
tion by allowing prehearing seizure only to establish jurisdiction or to
preserve the property for execution on any judgment that might be
obtained. The innkeeper must swear to specific factors entitling him
to such prehearing seizure and the guest is given an early opportunity
to disprove the allegations. If the innkeeper loses at the postseizure
hearing, he is liable to the guest for any damage done.
B. Model Statutes '
(a) Application to Judge. On application by an innkeeper, a judge
may issue an order permitting the innkeeper to seize and hold the
baggage of a guest if it can be done without breach of the peace.
Breach of the peace shall include fraud, deception, or any action
which creates some risk of violence, however slight.82
(b) Seizure by Sheriff. If the innkeeper includes in his application
an allegation that he cannot seize the property without breach of the
peace, the judge may issue a writ directing the sheriff to seize the
property and hold it for a period of 10 days at which time the sheriff
shall release the property to the innkeeper or to such other person as
the court may direct.
(c) Specific Allegations Necessary. The court shall not issue such or-
der or writ unless it concludes, from facts specifically alleged by the
innkeeper, that:
(1) The guest has at some time occupied the premises of the
innkeeper; and
(2) The guest has not paid the just charges of the innkeeper;
and
80. Hawkland, The Seed of Sniadach, CASE & Co., Feb. 1974, at 3, 19.
81. For alternative suggestions, see Note, supra note 45, at 185-86.
82. See Clark, supra note 22, at 311.
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(3) No substantial defenses are available to the guest and the
innkeeper is likely to prevail on the merits in a trial of the debt;
and
(4) The baggage is on the premises of the innkeeper; and
(5) (A) The guest is not subject to the personal jurisdiction of
the court; or
(B) There exists a significant likelihood that the guest will:
(i) destroy the property,
(ii) significantly impair the value of the property,
(iii) remove the property from the jurisdiction,
(iv) attempt to conceal the location or existence of the
property, or
(v) remove himself from the jurisdiction of the court.
(d) Conclusory Allegations Insufficient. The judge may not issue the
writ or the order if the innkeeper's allegations are in bare conclusory
form.
(e) Innkeepers' Bond. Before the order or writ shall be issued the
judge shall direct the innkeeper to pay into court security in an
amount at least equal to the amount of the debt alleged. This security
shall form a fund out of which damages for wrongfully taking or
retaining the baggage can be paid to the guest.
(f) Guest's Bond. The guest shall be entitled, and the order or writ
shall so state, to regain his baggage upon payment into court of secur-
ity in an amount equal to the value of the debt alleged or the value
of the property seized, whichever is lower.
(g) Hearing Available. The guest shall be entitled, and the order
or writ shall so state, to regain his baggage upon failure of the inn-
keeper to prove the validity of the debt and the absence of any valid
defenses or counterclaims at a hearing conducted for this purpose. The
guest may move the court for such a hearing at any time and the hear-
ing shall be held within 10 days of his motion. The innkeeper shall
bear the burden of proving his case by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.
(h) Damage Suit. If the innkeeper fails to prevail at such a hearing
the court may award damages, including reasonable attorney's fees,
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to the guest for the wrongful taking and retention of his property.
Such damages shall be in an amount that seems just to the court
and are payable out of, but are not limited to, the security given by
the innkeeper.
(i) Failure to Comply. If the innkeeper deprives the guest of his
property without obtaining an order under this section the innkeeper
shall return the property to the guest and, in addition, shall be liable
to the guest for damages in an amount equal to three times the value
of the property taken plus reasonable attorney's fees.
(j) Dissolution of Bonds. The innkeeper's security shall be returned
to him after a ruling in his favor at a hearing on the merits of the
debt or, upon his motion, 90 days after the property has been seized
and the guest has been served with a copy of the order or writ. In the
event that partial payment of the innkeeper's security has been made
to the guest, the excess shall be returned to the innkeeper. Security
provided by the guest shall be paid to the party who prevails at a hear-
ing on the merits of the debt.
CONCLUSION
This formulation of the statute differs in several significant ways
from the sequestration statute upheld in Mitchell. For instance, the
Supreme Court itself left the question of self-help repossession open.8
In addition, the Mitchell holding was further limited to property with
security interests seized and retained by the sheriff. However, the sig-
nificance of the Mitchell holding may possibly be summarized in this
statement by the Court:
[I]t comports with due process to permit the initial seizure on
sworn ex parte documents, followed by the early opportunity to put
the creditor to his proof. The nature of the issues at stake minimizes
the risk that the writ will be wrongfully issued by a judge. The poten-
tial damage award available, if there is a successful motion to dis-
solve the writ, as well as the creditor's own interest in avoiding in-
terrupting the transaction, also contribute to minimizing the risk.84
83. 94 S. Ct. at 1906 n.14.




Given the fact that a constitutional innkeepers' lien statute might
be possible, it is valid to pose the question of whether it is desirable to
resurrect it. The original justification for the lien no longer exists.
The value of the lien today, to society in general or to the lodging
industry in particular, might, as suggested in the cases, be limited.
The costs and benefits of the lien are such that hotels and motels
might not find it worthwhile to substitute their own liens or to lobby
for a statutory lien. The treatment of boarding and rooming estab-
lishments would be more consistent with evolving concepts of land-
lord and tenant law. It might be desirable to allow innkeepers to
establish quasi in rem jurisdiction over persons who are likely to leave
the jurisdiction, but there seems to be no reason why innkeepers
should be favored over other potential plaintiffs. In short, unless the
need for the innkeepers' lien becomes more apparent, it is probably
not worth the effort which it would take to breathe life into this late,
but unlamented, lien.
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